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INTERNATIONAL LEGAL UPDATES
NORTH AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN
TROY DAVIS EXECUTION EXPOSES
INEQUITY BETWEEN THE CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT CASES WITH DNA
EVIDENCE AND THOSE WITHOUT
Since 1989, 273 people have been
exonerated in the United States through
DNA evidence; including seventeen people
who were executed before DNA was able
to prove their innocence. While DNA
testing has undeniably been a silver bullet
in exonerating those who were not guilty,
only about 10 percent of criminal cases
actually have DNA evidence. Individuals
seeking to assert post-conviction evidence
in cases without DNA evidence are forced
to navigate undefined standards of proof,
leaving them in an often intractable legal
situation.
Troy Davis, who was executed in
September 2011 for the murder of off-duty
police officer Mark MacPhail, was among
those in the ninety percent of cases that
lacked DNA evidence. Instead, the conviction was based solely on nine eyewitness
reports, seven of which were later recanted
citing police coercion. Yet Davis’s postconviction challenges in state court, his
habeas corpus petition in federal court,
and his petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court were all denied.
In capital punishment cases, like
Davis’s, the Supreme Court has failed to
establish a clear path for proving postconviction innocence. In Herrera v. Collins,
a case involving a post-conviction claim of
innocence, the Court focused on defending procedure, yet expressed discomfort
in dicta with the Constitution allowing
the execution of an innocent person. The
majority in Herrera ultimately found that
“a claim of ‘actual innocence’ is not itself
a constitutional claim” and may have a
“very disruptive effect” on the justice system. The disagreement within the Court
in Herrera and the subsequent conflicting
jurisprudence about post-conviction claims
of innocence, has led to a general state of
confusion in the law.
Despite this confusion, Davis filed a
successful original writ petition and his

case was moved to the Southern District
Court of Georgia under the “actual
innocence” exception. This exception
allows a federal court to hear the merits of
successive claims if the failure to hear the
claims would constitute a “miscarriage of
justice.” However, the Supreme Court has
failed to establish when innocence is just
a gateway through which a habeas petition
must pass and when it falls under the miscarriage of justice exception. Moreover,
courts have employed different approaches
to applying the “actual innocence” standard
in determining whether post-conviction
claims should be heard. While some courts
balance the evidence of innocence against
the reliability of the state’s verdict, others
apply the “extraordinarily high” burden of
proof standard established by the Supreme
Court in Herrera.
While Davis’s claim is the first ever
innocence claim to pass the “extraordinarily
high” threshold assumed to exist
in Herrera, the language of In re Davis,
provides that the district court must determine whether evidence “that could not
have been obtained at the time of the trial
clearly establishes petitioner’s innocence.”
The Georgia Federal Judge who reexamined Davis’s case after it was sent to the
District court ruled that the recantations by
key witnesses “cast some additional, minimal doubt on his conviction,” but “were not
sufficient for a new trial.” According to the
Judge, while doubt existed, it was “absent
a truly persuasive showing of innocence.”
Essentially, individuals lacking DNA
evidence are stuck in a Catch-22; if a
conviction is based on faulty evidence, the
reviewing court defers to the discretion
of the jury verdict based on said faulty
evidence to determine whether a defendant
could be innocent. In a striking illustration
of this, the Supreme Court has refused to
hear the appeals of thirty of the thirty-one
individuals who were subsequently exonerated by DNA. If DNA testing has taught
us anything, it is that the criminal justice system is extraordinarily fallible. This
problem extends beyond Troy Davis: if 273
people were exonerated using DNA evidence after being convicted beyond a reasonable doubt, one might reasonably infer
25

from a statistical perspective that there are
many other innocent individuals among the
90 percent without DNA evidence.
The Supreme Court held in Sawyer
v. Smith that the “Eighth Amendment
protects against the risk that the death
penalty would be imposed in an arbitrary
or capricious manner.” A poignant example
of this arbitrariness is the case of Marcus
Ray Johnson who was due to be executed
in the same chamber as Davis just two
weeks later, but unlike Davis, was granted
a stay by a Georgia court in order to investigate new DNA evidence. The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
states “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .” Surely, this procedural
equality provided under the Due Process
Clause is most important when it comes
to the State’s most severe deprivation, life,
but with extremely high and undefined
standards for post-conviction exoneration
in capital punishment, the justice system
is failing.

MASS ARRESTS OF PEACEFUL
PROTESTORS MAY CONSTITUTE A
VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The right to peacefully protest is at the
foundation of democracy and international
human rights law, but the line between crowd
control and the violation of these rights is
sometimes difficult to define. In some
cases, such as in Libya, where protestors
were met with a full-scale military assault,
it is easy to see the abuse of the right to
assemble and speak freely. What is more
difficult to delineate is whether there have
been veritable human rights abuses in the
response to the recent string of “Occupy
Wall Street” protests, which have led to
mass arrests and accusations of excessive
use of force by law enforcement.
The national “Occupy Wall Street”
movement formed as a general protest
of income inequality and record
corporate profits during a period of high
unemployment. The movement has been
described as “a horizontally organized
resistance movement employing the
revolutionary Arab Spring tactic to restore
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democracy in America.” The right to
assemble in this manner is upheld under
national and international law because it
serves the purpose of allowing a population
to organize, protest, and exercise free
speech as an important mechanism of
political participation.

conditions as they are, or even stirs people
to anger.” In light of this rationale, the
Court concluded that freedom of speech is
protected “unless shown likely to produce
a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil that rises far above public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”

The First Amendment of the United
States Constitution as well as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) protect
protestors’ rights to exercise free speech
and free assembly. The ICCPR applies both
domestically and abroad and these rights
may not be abridged through arbitrary
arrest or detention, except in situations that
threaten national security or public safety.
The ICCPR provides that law enforcement
officials should use force only as a last
resort, in proportion to the threat posed,
and in a way to minimize damage or injury.

The difficulty with what the Supreme
Court calls freedom of speech’s “highest
purpose” to create unrest, is that the
point at which it does so is exactly the
point at which it can be suppressed
for not being “peaceful,” making it
inherently complicated to regulate.
Though Edwards proffers the subjective test
of whether the speech is producing “clear
and present danger” to determine when it
can be censored, the discretion afforded to
police officers in crowd control increases
the risk of both first amendment and
international human rights violations. Yet,
as the Supreme Court explained in Hague
v. Committee For Industrial Organization,
the state cannot use uncontrolled force to
restrain freedom of speech as a substitute
for their duty to maintain order. The challenge remains to find innovative ways for
both police and protesters to walk the fine
line between ensuring safety and protecting
human rights.

Nevertheless, on October 1, 2011,
Occupy Wall Street protesters marched
across the Brooklyn Bridge in New York
City and approximately 700 individuals
were subsequently arrested en masse by
police. The Partnership for Civil Justice
Fund filed a lawsuit on behalf of protestors alleging that police entrapped protesters into illegal activity so they could be
arrested. This is not an unfamiliar story for
protestors. The Fund in 2010 won an $8.25
million class action settlement in a similar case of the mass arrest of nearly 400
people in Pershing Park in Washington,
D.C. Mass arrests such as these inevitably
involve arbitrary arrest because a crowd is
not a single entity but a variety of individuals, only some of whom may be breaking
the law while others are well within their
right to continue in peaceful protest.
While the U.S. government has the
authority to make reasonable regulations
concerning the manner in which
individuals express themselves, the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution guarantee that individuals
may peacefully express or propagate ideas,
either verbally or otherwise, in areas open
to the public. Even a disorderly crowd,
or the fear of one, cannot be used to stop
a peaceful demonstration or violate the
right to peaceably assemble. In Edwards
v. South Carolina, the Supreme Court held
that free speech “may indeed best serve its
high purpose when it induces a condition
of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with

Anna Naimark, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers North America and the
Caribbean for the Human Rights Brief.

LATIN AMERICA
PERU ENACTS LAW OF PRIOR
CONSULTATION WITH INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES
This September, Peruvian President
Ollanta Humala signed his country’s longawaited law of free prior and informed consent (FPIC) with indigenous peoples, the
Law of the Right to Prior Consultation with
Indigenous or Tribal Peoples, Recognized
in Convention 169 of the International
Labor Organization. The principle of
FPIC requires that indigenous peoples
be informed, in a culturally appropriate
manner, about government projects that
will affect them, and that they be given
the opportunity to object to these projects moving forward. Although Humala
acknowledged that changes for Peru’s
indigenous peoples would not occur overnight, the passage and signing of this law
26

marks a major step forward in recognizing many of their rights enshrined in the
International Labor Organization’s (ILO)
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention
(ILO Convention) and the American
Convention on Human Rights, to both of
which Peru is a state-party, and the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (Declaration).
In late spring 2009, the long-standing
marginalization of indigenous peoples in
Peru by the government and private corporations became newly apparent, as protests
erupted in Bagua province, in northern
Peru, against the proposed expansion of
drilling, logging, and hydroelectric dam
projects in rain forest territory. The violence that ensued finally prompted the
Peruvian Congress to pass the FPIC law.
Despite concerns by former President Alan
García that the law would hinder economic
growth by preventing foreign investment,
President Humala and indigenous rights
activists argued that the law would actually
facilitate economic growth. By working
with indigenous peoples to reach an agreement on economic development projects,
conflicts like the situation in Bagua will
not occur. Regardless of the potential economic effects of FPIC, Peru is now obligated under both international law and
domestic law to consult with indigenous
peoples on projects that may affect them.
FPIC as a right is intrinsically linked
to many other rights protected under international human rights mechanisms, especially the right to participation, the communal right to property, and the right
to cultural identity. Article 6 of the ILO
Convention asserts that states-parties must
consult with indigenous and tribal peoples, through the appropriate representative
institutions, whenever they are considering the implementation of legislative or
administrative measures that will have a
direct effect on the peoples concerned.
The American Convention details the right
to participation in Article 23, and in the
case of indigenous peoples, this right is
broadened to include participation through
“their own institutions and according to
their values, practices, customs and forms
of organization.” The UN Declaration, in
articles 18, 19, and 26-30, addresses participation and communal property rights,
stating that indigenous peoples may choose
their own representatives and mechanisms
to participate in decision making pro-
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cesses, and that they have the right to use
their lands and territories as they see fit.
Finally, the American Convention and the
UN Declaration both include the rights
of all citizens to fully participate in the
cultural life of their countries and to the
full enjoyment of their own cultural identities. Projects for which indigenous peoples
must be consulted inherently affect their
cultural life because indigenous culture
and traditions are so connected to the land
on which they live.
Peru’s new law adopts much of the
same language used in the international
documents, notably in Articles 2, 4, 6, and
14, which address the right to FPIC, participation, good faith negotiation, absence
of coercion, and inter-cultural dialogue.
The law states that both indigenous peoples
and the Peruvian government may identify
projects that will affect the indigenous, and
that each side must present their analysis of
a project’s effects in a timely manner. The
government must also maintain a registry
of different indigenous peoples’ representative organizations in order to facilitate
information sharing. Despite the ultimate
goal of FPIC being a satisfactory agreement between the state and indigenous
people, the government has the final say
in deciding which projects move forward if
there is a dispute between the parties.
Peru has joined Bolivia, Colombia, and
Ecuador, which also have prior consultation
laws or have incorporated ILO Convention
language into their Constitutions. These
countries have set the standard for FPIC
for the rest of the signatories to the ILO
Convention by integrating international
law into their domestic laws. Despite possible difficulties in practical implementation
as states and indigenous peoples attempt
to reach mutually satisfactory decisions
regarding development projects, Peru’s
FPIC law will ideally empower indigenous
peoples to take a lead role in the decisionmaking processes that affect them.

MILITARY JUSTICE REFORM IN MEXICO
AMID INCREASED VIOLENCE
This summer, the Mexican Supreme
Court proclaimed that allegations of human
rights abuses perpetrated by members of
the military will now be adjudicated in
the country’s civilian courts. The change
was in response to a lengthy campaign for
military justice reform by human rights
groups, as well as the decision of the

Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACtHR) in Radilla Pacheco v. México,
holding the Mexican state accountable for
the forced disappearance of Radilla at the
hands of Mexican soldiers in 1974. The
decision directed Mexico to give its nonmilitary courts jurisdiction over human
rights cases involving members of the
military. The Mexican Supreme Court also
responded by ordering the judiciary to
verify whether statutory and case law comply with Mexico’s obligations under international human rights law. These actions
are part of a wider attempt on the part of
the Mexican government to respond to
international criticism of how the violence
plaguing the country is being addressed:
President Felipe Calderón has also proposed reforms to the National Security
Law; and, last spring the legislature passed
sweeping reforms to the Constitution,
incorporating international human rights
standards language.
In its opinion, the Mexican Supreme
Court found that Article 57 of the country’s
Military Justice Code violated Mexico’s
obligations under international human
rights law by permitting military personnel to only be tried in military courts. In
Mexico, judges in military courts answer
to the Defense Secretary, and therefore
may be hesitant to preside over cases that
highlight military abuses. This creates a
culture of impunity, in which soldiers can
violate their fellow citizens’ rights without
fear of reprisal. The Supreme Court’s decision, therefore, is compliant with international law and also invaluable for Mexico’s
efforts to combat impunity and defend
human rights.
Mexico is a state-party to the American
Convention on Human Rights, the InterAmerican Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture, the Inter-American Convention
on Forced Disappearance of Persons, and
the Inter-American Convention on the
Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication
of Violence Against Women. The IACtHR
based its recommendations on Radilla
and three other cases that helped prompt
the Supreme Court’s ruling on elements
of these laws. For example, in the case
of Cabrera García y Montiel Flores v.
México, the Mexican government was held
accountable for the illegal detention and
torture of Cabrera and Montiel by soldiers
in 1999. In the cases of Fernández Ortega
y otros v. México and Rosendo Cantú y
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otra v. México, the IACtHR found Mexico
accountable for the rape and torture of the
two named plaintiffs, indigenous women,
by Mexican soldiers in 2002. Following
a formal declaration by the Military
Prosecutor’s Office recognizing its lack
of jurisdiction over these cases as a result
of the Supreme Court decision, criminal
investigations about the allegations have
been moved to the Attorney General’s
Office and the civilian courts.
In October 2010, President Calderón
proposed to include torture, rape, and
forced disappearance as crimes to be adjudicated in civilian courts under the Military
Justice Code. However, human rights activists rejected the proposal because arbitrary arrest, which often leads to other
human rights violations, was not included.
Extrajudicial killings, also not included,
have dramatically increased along with
other generalized forms of violence.
Calderón’s proposal did not pass, but the
Supreme Court’s decision has now essentially superseded it by holding the military
accountable for all human rights abuses in
civilian court.
The Supreme Court’s ruling comes at
a time when accountability and rule of
law are of ever-increasing importance,
as Mexico battles against narco-trafficker-induced violence and the resultant
increased military presence throughout the
country. Since December 2006 more than
forty thousand Mexican troops have been
deployed across the country to aid in
the war on drugs. Since then, Mexico’s
National Human Rights Commission has
reported a drastic increase in the number
of allegations against soldiers of serious
human rights violations, including torture,
murder, forced kidnapping, and rape. The
violent criminal activity in Mexico has
undeniably resulted in a far greater number of human rights abuses. However, the
military, as an agent of the Mexican state,
has a duty to protect the country’s citizens.
This duty is undermined if it too disregards
respect for human rights.
Military justice reform is a growing trend across Latin America. Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, and Peru have also reformed
parts of their military justice systems,
recognizing the importance of transferring
cases to civilian jurisdiction in order to aid
in the fight against impunity. The recent
Mexican Supreme Court decision is a step
towards helping Mexico begin to address
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past human rights violations perpetrated by
the military, while also promoting accountability in the future.
Christina Fetterhoff, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, covers Latin America for
the Human Rights Brief.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
NOT WHAT THE DOCTOR ORDERED:
HOW THE MILITARY ATTACKS ON
BAHRAIN’S NATIONAL HEALTHCARE
SYSTEM UNDERMINE ITS TREATY
OBLIGATIONS
On March 16, 2011, the Bahrain
Defense Force (BDF) occupied Salmaniya
Medical Complex (SMC) in the capital city
of Manama, disrupting medical treatment
and preventing ambulances from leaving to
help those injured in anti-government protests. According to a July 18, 2011 Human
Rights Watch report, the occupation of the
SMC is only one part of the Bahraini government’s systematic campaign targeting
medical professionals and anti-government
protesters in need of medical care. As
a party to the International Convention
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), Bahrain is not only obligated
to “assure medical service and medical
access” to all citizens in the case of illness,
but is also prohibited from curtailing that
medical access. The systematic targeting of
patients and medical personnel contravenes
international principles protecting the right
to access healthcare established in Article
12 of the ICESCR.
While the protests that prompted the
siege were partly in response to similar antigovernment movements across the Middle
East, they were more directly aimed at the
Sunni royal family’s attempts to keep the
Shiite majority out of the political process.
Bahrain is one of the only Shiite majority
countries in the Middle East, and the Sunni
minority is disproportionately represented
in government. Bahrain reacted to these
protests by cracking down on dissenters
in a number of ways, including by targeting the medical system. After occupying SMC and other medical facilities, the
BDF began the systematic and targeted
abuse and interrogation of patients with
protest-related injuries. The military also
held more than seventy treating physicians
incommunicado before trying them in

military tribunals. Reports and interviews
of hospital personnel substantiate claims
that the government prevented access to
healthcare for those injured by participating in anti-government protests. Although
the occupation of the SMC occurred during a state of emergency declared by King
Hamad, derogation during a state of emergency is only permissible when the life of
the nation is at stake, and then only to an
extent strictly required by the emergency.
Even if the state of emergency is justified,
Bahrain’s affirmative abuse of the medical
community and patients does not serve
a legitimate purpose protecting national
needs during a time of crisis.
As a party to the ICESCR, Bahrain
must comply with Article 12(2)(d), which
requires “[t]he creation of conditions
which would assure to all medical service
and medical attention in the case of sickness.” The UN Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR)
General Comment 14 further informs the
interpretation of Article 12(2)(d), requiring
governments to ensure the right to health
by respecting the right through government action, protecting the right through
government policy, and fulfilling the right
through legislation.
Though the presence of the military
at hospitals does not itself undermine
Bahrain’s commitments under international
law, any prolonged occupation that involves
the mistreatment of medical personnel and
patients as a matter of policy gives rise
to material violations. Specifically, this
includes preventing international organizations from rendering aid, and undermining
the respect and protection required of hospitals and medical personnel. The systematic and all-encompassing nature of BDF
attacks on field workers, hospital facilities,
and the patients and doctors therein constitute disruption of citizens’ right to healthcare at multiple access points. Under the
UNCESCR interpretation of the ICESCR,
the healthcare system should not be limited
on the basis of any discrimination, including on the grounds of religion or political
opinion or status. Denying protesters treatment in hospitals on the basis of political
expression constitutes discrimination of
the sort prohibited by the ICESCR.
The abrogation of the right to health
is only a part of the Bahraini government’s disregard for human rights during
the period of political instability in the
28

Spring of 2011. The country is still feeling
the deleterious effects of the government’s
attack on the healthcare system. More than
1,400 people have been arrested and 3,600
dismissed from their jobs since the protests began, and while the prison sentences
of those health workers handed down by
military tribunal were recently overturned,
this is more placatory than substantive; the
doctors will still be prosecuted in civilian
court.
Limitations placed on the right to health
in Bahrain through the actions of the BDF
appear to represent a disconnect between
the rule of human rights law and its application. Whether the hospital occupations
and subsequent mistreatment are acts of
willful disregard or material misunderstanding, the global community’s response
to such a gap between rule and implementation may send a signal to other countries
in similar future human rights quandaries.

ONE STRIKE, YOU’RE OUT: EGYPT’S
EXPANDED EMERGENCY LAW POSES A
RISK TO THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
In early September 2011, Egypt’s provisional government, the Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces (SCAF), expanded
the country’s emergency law to its widest
scope since the provisional government
took power. The SCAF claimed the expansion of the emergency law was a response
to unrest created by civilian attacks on the
Israeli Embassy in Cairo on September
9, 2011. Nevertheless, widespread strikes
threatening to bring the government to the
negotiating table just before the announcement likely factored into the decision to
expand the law’s provisions. According to
Amnesty International, the law’s expansion represents the “greatest erosion of
human rights since the resignation of
President Hosni Mubarak.” In the past, the
Egyptian government has arrested workers
for strikes and assembling outside of work
hours, and Amnesty International contends
that the frequency of such arrests may
increase under the new emergency law.
The working population of Egypt has historically been very politically active, and
as of February 2011, there was a strike in
some part of the Egyptian manufacturing
sector every day for the past three years.
The expanded emergency law may unfairly
limit the power of the Egyptian workforce
by removing critical labor negotiation tools
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in violation of Egypt’s international treaty
responsibilities not to impede their usage.

into direct and unequivocal limitation of
workers’ rights.

Inter alia, the new measures prohibit
“assault[s] on freedom to work,” which has
been taken by Amnesty International to
implicitly provide for the search, arrest, and
detention of workers on strike. The emergency law also directs the trials of those
detained to the (Emergency) Supreme State
Security Courts, which limit defendants’
access to counsel and the right of those
convicted to appeal. While the provision at
issue does not explicitly prohibit strikes, its
character threatens human rights in Egypt
by giving security forces a broader, more
general mandate to detain workers and
disrupt methods of collective bargaining in
the name of protecting Egyptians’ right to
report to work, even though the methods
being curtailed are guaranteed by international agreements.

The decision to characterize labor stoppage and other tools of collective bargaining as “assault[s] on freedom to work”
would unfairly limit methods of employment negotiation and organization if used
as Amnesty International contends it may
be. These rights are essential for effective representation of the interests of the
Egyptian workforce and expressly provided for by ILO Conventions 87 and 98.
The new emergency law is a step backwards for those hoping for a demonstrable
change from the overly restrictive policies
in place for decades under the Mubarak
regime.

Article 8 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) protects the right of workers to
strike by recognizing the ability to strike as
a critical tool for workers engaged in collective bargaining. General Comment 18 of
the Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ESCR), which informs
Article 8, calls collective bargaining “a
tool of fundamental importance in the formulation of employment policies. The right
to collective bargaining is also codified in
International Labor Organization (ILO)
Conventions 87 and 98, both of which
Egypt ratified. Article 3(2) of Convention
87 guarantees the freedom of workers to
organize and prohibits public authorities
from interfering or restricting the right or
its exercise. Along the same lines, Article
1(2)(b) of ILO Convention 98 guarantees
protection from acts that prejudice union
workers because of membership or participation in union activities outside working
hours.
The Egyptian government’s use of
the emergency law to constrain collective bargaining would represent a material breach of international treaty obligations. Although the Egyptian government
arrested workers for striking as recently as
July, under the expanded emergency law
the frequency and scope of such arrests
could increase. The decision by the SCAF
to declare, even if only implicitly, a prohibition on the right to strike cannot be
defended under even the narrowest interpretations of these conventions and crosses

Kyle Bates, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers the Middle East and North
Africa for the Human Rights Brief.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
A POTENTIAL END TO IMPUNITY FOR
THE DRC’S WORST WAR CRIMINALS
The Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) has undergone horrific violence
during two wars from 1996 to 1997 and
1998 to 2003. In October 2010, the United
Nations Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights released the first comprehensive analysis (mapping report) detailing
the atrocities committed in eastern Congo
by Congolese senior army officials. The
mapping report documents human rights
abuses against civilians, including the use
of child soldiers, gender-based violence,
mass killings, and torture. The report not
only highlights the issue of impunity for
war criminals, but also offers potential
solutions to bring such criminals to justice. One of these proposed solutions, a
specialized mixed court to try the individuals responsible for the most serious war
crimes, is currently being considered by
the Congolese legislature.
A mixed court would try war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity
that have occurred in the DRC over the last
three decades as well as present and future
crimes. The court would be composed of
Congolese officials and both international
experts and judges. The court is termed
“mixed” because while it would be situated within the domestic judicial system,
it would temporarily employ international
29

experts to lend their knowledge and establish international credibility. A mixed court
is distinguishable from an international
tribunal because it would allow for greater
Congolese ownership and responsibility.
An example of a similar court is the Bosnia
and Herzegovina War Crimes Chamber
(WCC), which incorporated international
judges to prevent political interference
but instituted benchmarks for phasing out
international staff. While the WCC has
been criticized for its ultimate implementation of the transition process, it has successfully processed numerous cases.
The mixed court concept was initially
proposed in 2004 by Congolese nongovernmental organizations, legal experts, and
various human rights advocates as a way
to hold accountable those responsible for
the gravest human rights violations. Until
now, the only criminal actions against
Congolese war criminals have been heard
in military courts, primarily against lowlevel officials. While military courts have
made significant efforts to incorporate
investigation and prosecution standards
established by the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), they
tend to be structurally weak and easily influenced by political interference.
Because the ICC can only pursue a limited number of high profile cases such
as the trial of the former Congolese Vice
President Jean-Pierre Bemba, the mixed
court would fill the impunity gap that has
plagued the DRC for decades.
In April 2011, members of Congolese
civil society, human rights groups, and
international stakeholders met to discuss
the draft legislation and propose essential
improvements. The suggested improvements include amendments guaranteeing
integration of international staff, reparations for victims, and assurance that the
accused will be given fair and equitable
trials. In July, a new version of the draft
was adopted by the Congolese Council
of Ministers and sent for review to the
Senate’s Political, Administrative, and
Judicial Commission.
While the proposed legislation is promising, the most recent draft has aroused
controversy among the human rights community because the mixed court would
be situated within the national judicial
system, which is also in need of reform,
and mandates the death penalty for those
convicted. Human Rights Watch is con-
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cerned that the court could become an
“instrument of execution.” Another cause
for concern is the possibility that the inclusion of the death penalty provision could
dissuade the involvement of international
experts because many in the international
community consider the punishment to be
inherently cruel and inhumane.
Another major concern is the draft
legislation’s lack of provisions protecting
the rights of defendants. To be considered
a fair and effective judicial process, defendants must be provided qualified representation. Furthermore, the mixed court’s
ability to extend jurisdiction to abuses
perpetrated after the periods of war relies
on building the capacity of the Congolese
domestic judicial system. If the State fails
to mandate fair trials for each of the
accused, there is a strong possibility that a
resulting loss of credibility will jeopardize
capacity-building efforts. As the legislation
is considered, human rights advocates continue to encourage amendments essential
for viable justice, and remain optimistic
that the enactment of a mixed court will
combat the Congolese climate of impunity.

AFRICAN OPPOSITION TO THE UN
RESOLUTION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
& GENDER IDENTITY
In June 2011, the United Nations (UN)
Human Rights Council adopted L.9/Rev.1,
the Resolution on Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity (Resolution). It is the
first UN resolution to address the rights of
the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) community. The Resolution, put
forward by South Africa amidst widespread anti-LGBT activity in Africa, brings
attention to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, and
also demonstrates that the rise in violence
against lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and
transgender people will not be tolerated.
The Resolution reiterates the fundamental rights to freedom and dignity to
which every person is entitled per the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, and the
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). It requests that
the High Commissioner of Human Rights
conduct a study documenting discriminatory laws, practices, and acts of violence
against individuals based on their sexual
orientation and gender identity. A panel

discussion will be held following the study,
during the 19th session of the Human
Rights Council in 2012, with the goal of
assessing how international human rights
law can be used to combat LGBT discrimination, and also to consider discrimination
eradication strategies for the future.
Numerous African states have opposed
the Resolution, which narrowly passed
with twenty-three states in favor and nineteen opposed. Among the nineteen states
voting against the Resolution, nine of
them were African; they include Angola,
Cameroon, Djibouti, Gabon, Ghana,
Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda.
The Resolution has aroused backlash from
several of these states. In reaction to the
proposed resolution, Nigeria claimed
the proposal is contrary to the beliefs of
most Africans, and a Mauritanian diplomat deemed the resolution “an attempt to
replace the natural rights of a human being
with an unnatural right.”
In addition to vocally opposing the
Resolution, a few African leaders have
continued to allow and even promote antiLGBT legislation within their countries.
For example, Senegal continues to criminalize homosexuality in its Penal Code
despite its ratification of the ICCPR
and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), which require
states to protect and promote the rights of
all citizens equally. Several African states,
including Mauritania, Sudan, and parts
of Nigeria and Somalia, treat homosexual
acts as crimes punishable by death. Most
visible in recent years is the controversial
proposed legislation in Uganda calling for
various punishments of all who commit
homosexual acts and those who support
them, including the death penalty. In total,
thirty-six African states have laws criminalizing homosexuality.
LGBT discrimination and violence
directed at LGBT individuals is particularly
rampant in sub-Saharan Africa, with torture, imprisonment, and murder of LGBTidentified individuals occurring most frequently. Additionally, the sexual assault
of lesbians in an attempt to change their
sexuality, referred to as corrective rape, is
common, especially in South Africa. Some
of these violations are permitted by African
states that have maintained anti-sodomy
laws since colonization and have failed to
punish perpetrators of hate crimes.
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In contrast, South Africa, where corrective rape is prevalent, has taken the lead
on combating violence and discrimination
based on sexual orientation. South Africa
originally passed a constitutional prohibition against LGBT discrimination in 1994,
and in 1996, the Constitutional Court
overturned anti-sodomy laws because
of their inconsistency with its reformed
Constitution. Moreover, in addition to
sponsoring the Resolution, South Africa is
currently the only African country to allow
same-sex marriage.
Despite overwhelming African opposition and only a modicum of support within
the region, LGBT activists recognize the
Resolution’s signal of support for LGBT
rights and celebrate the UN’s first resolution addressing LGBT discrimination.
After years of inconsistent positions on
the issue of sexual orientation and gender
identity, civil society groups are proud that
South Africa has set a standard for other
African countries to attain. Human rights
activists applaud the Resolution and the
attention to human rights violations based
on sexual orientation, and encourage UN
member states to comply with international
standards.
Saralyn Salisbury, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers Sub-Saharan Africa for the
Human Rights Brief.

EUROPE
REFUGEE RIGHTS AND ITALY’S
RESPONSE TO THE INFLUX OF NORTH
AFRICAN MIGRANTS
Thousands of African migrants have
traveled to Europe since January 2011 following the Arab Spring, most entering the
European Union (EU) through the Italian
islands of Lampedusa and Sicily. An estimated 50,000 migrants have reached Italy
this year to date, with weekly reports of
additional migrants arriving in Italy. Italy
was unprepared for such a large influx of
migrants, and its response has highlighted
the existing divide between international
human rights principles and the reality
of implementing those principles on the
ground.
As an EU member and a UN party,
several international human rights laws
bind and impose obligations on Italy in its
capacity as a receiving state of potential ref-
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ugees. First, Italy must accept any asylumseekers requesting entry into its borders.
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights recognizes the right of
every person to seek and enjoy asylum
in another country, and the EU Council
Directive on the Temporary Protection of
Displaced Persons requires that asylumseekers be admitted to the country where
they first seek refuge. Second, Italy cannot
expel asylum-seekers once granted entry.
The UN Convention and Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees espouses the
principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits the expulsion or return of refugees
against their will to territories where their
life or freedom would be threatened. Third,
as the first receiving state, Italy must process each refugee’s application for asylum
according to the Dublin agreement.
The current migrant situation presents
difficulties in meeting these requirements.
Each migrant traveling from North Africa
has a unique background and immigration
purpose. Many migrants are Egyptian,
Tunisian, and Libyan, fleeing states in
political and economic upheaval stemming
from the Arab Spring revolutions. Some
are political and ethnic refugees; others
are economic migrants. Other migrants
who were once economic immigrants to
North Africa are now fleeing the region
after experiencing increased racial and
ethnic persecution stemming from economic instability. Additionally, refugees
from Somali, Ethiopian and Eritrean refugee camps located in the horn of Africa
are traveling through Arab Spring states,
hoping to obtain refugee status in Europe.
Both refugees and economic immigrants
are traveling collectively and intermingled.
Nevertheless, each migrant’s immigration
status must be processed individually.
The UN Convention on Refugees
defines refugee as an individual who is
unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin due to a well-founded fear
of persecution based on the individual’s
race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion. Receiving states must first ascertain
whether a migrant is a refugee, or some
other type of immigrant. The heterogeneity of these migrants particularly requires
that any migrant traveling through or from
an Arab Spring country be considered a
potential refugee upon departure from that
state. Assumptions otherwise risk the possibility that true refugees will be denied

their rights. In light of these facts, some
Italian responses to the migrant influx
appear questionable.
Struggling to manage ever-increasing
numbers of migrants, Italy teamed with the
EU Border Protection Agency, Frontex, in
February 2011, to initiate Joint Operation
Hermes 2011, which focuses on detecting
and preventing illegitimate border crossings. Prioritizing increased border controls
has potentially resulted in the violation of
international refugee laws. Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International have
reported incidents involving migrant boats
that Italian officials have either blocked
from docking in Italian ports or potentially
failed to aid in distress. Policies preventing
illegitimate border crossings are permissible assuming they allow for potential
refugees to freely seek asylum. Without
any means of accurately and immediately
distinguishing between asylum-seekers
and illegal immigrants, Italy’s policy risks
violating international refugee laws regarding treatment of asylum-seekers.
Italy’s inability to promptly process
the mass influx of migrants has resulted
in riots at border control stations and
immigration camps, and has emboldened
many migrants to escape the camps before
processing. Some have immigrated to
other EU nations, resulting in conflicts
between Italy and other EU states regarding Italy’s management of the situation.
The migrant influx occurs at an interesting time in European politics, with many
right-wing political organizations calling
for stricter immigration laws. European
governments will likely find implementing international refugee laws challenging
considering the current economic situation
and increasing resistance from right-wing
parties. Ultimately, how Europe responds
to the mass influx of migrants from North
Africa will be a defining indication of the
enforceability of international refugee law,
and adherence to guiding principles.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE FRENCH
LAW BANNING PRAYER IN PARIS’
PUBLIC STREETS
In September 2011, France implemented a new law banning prayer in Paris’
public streets. Legislators passed the law
in response to increasingly common occurrences whereby Muslim worshippers overflow from mosques, spread their mats upon
the ground, and pray in nearby streets.
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Though technically permitted under EU
law, the ban focuses more on religious
practice than on public crowds, and falls
within a sequence of legislation that
reflects a French political climate increasingly adverse to freedom of religion. The
ban on prayer in Paris streets highlights a
consistent struggle many states face when
enforcing international human rights principles–balancing secularism with respect
for varied religious beliefs.
Under international human rights law,
individuals have a fundamental human
right to practice religion in public spaces.
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) acknowledges the
right of every person to manifest her religion or beliefs, “either alone, or in community with others and in public or private.”
Both the Council of Europe Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Article 9, and the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, Article 10, mirror UDHR
Article 18. These documents, however,
permit this fundamental human right to
be curbed by statute when required to
protect public safety, order, health, and
morale, or when necessary to protect the
rights and freedoms of others. This same
struggle between secularism and freedom
of religion can be found in Article 1 of
the French constitution, which states that
France shall be a secular Republic that
respects all beliefs and ensures equality
without distinction of religion.
Accordingly, France is within its legal
rights in passing the ban on prayer in public
streets. French legislators have likely justified the law with the public safety exception. However, evidence also suggests
some officials have justified the ban as
effectuating public sentiment toward religion. French right-wing political groups
frequently call attention to the growing
Muslim population and the problems these
groups believe the Muslim religion poses
to a secular state. This sentiment seems
consistent with the legislation’s application. The law is designed to reduce street
crowds and improve traffic flow, but rather
than forbidding the formation of crowds in
public spaces without a permit, the law is
specifically aimed to prevent individuals
from openly practicing religion in public
streets. Claude Gueant, the French Interior
Minister, summarized the intent of the legislation when he said that the streets are for
driving, not praying, and further declared

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 6
that praying in the streets is “not dignified
for religious practice and violates the principles of secularism.”
There has been minimal backlash to the
law from the French Muslim community,
which may result from the relatively small
percentage of practicing French Muslims
– 10% according to some Muslim associations. Nevertheless, despite claims by
Interior Minister Mr. Gueant that French
Muslim leaders agree with the ban, a small
but angry protest occurred on the first day
of its implementation.
The ban follows just six months after
the implementation of the law prohibiting
head coverings in public places in April
2011. These laws evidence a contemporaneous struggle within France toward the
increasingly large Muslim population and
its integration into French society. While
many Muslims may not have been upset
by the ban, their silence does not diminish French society’s need to reconcile its
secular roots with its changing demography. Nor does it lessen the international
community’s interest in ensuring that fundamental human rights are respected and
protected, regardless of location.
France faces the challenge of a rapidly changing demographic in its society,
not unlike the challenges faced by other
similarly homogenous European states. In
fact, French legislation in response to
this challenge may have recently served
as a model to other European nations
with similar concerns. For example, the
Netherlands and Belgium recently passed
laws prohibiting head coverings in public places, following similar legislation in
France. This potential for influence makes
the legislation in France banning prayer
in Paris’ public streets that much more
relevant to the international community at
large. France will not be the only state to
confront issues of public displays of religion, but its response to that confrontation
may ultimately guide the overall European
response to increasingly diverse societies.
How France reconciles its constitutional
principles of religious freedom and secularism will ultimately serve as an example
for other European states wrestling with
similar questions.
Rachael Curtis, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers Europe for the Human
Rights Brief.

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
ENFORCING THE PROPISKA SYSTEM:
RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT
TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN
UZBEKISTAN
In August, the Uzbek government began
enforcing residency restrictions in the capital of Tashkent to prepare for Uzbekistan’s
Independence Day on September 1, 2011.
Police conducted raids to identify and
expel Uzbek citizens without Tashkent
propiskas (residency permits) in an attempt
to remove the unemployed lower class from
the capital city. The widespread expulsion
of citizens from Tashkent through propiska
enforcement is at odds with Uzbekistan’s
international obligations as a party to the
International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) because it prevents Uzbek citizens from moving freely
throughout the country and establishing
residence where they choose.
In a 1999 resolution, Uzbekistan reinstated the Soviet-era policy of using propiskas to track and restrict the movement
of citizens throughout the country. Uzbek
citizens are now required to live in the
district specified on their propiska and
cannot legally obtain permission to live in
Tashkent. In the years following the reinstatement of the Soviet-era system, police
did not enforce propiskas because urban
redevelopment projects required thousands
of unskilled rural laborers, many of whom
lacked the propiskas necessary to remain
in Tashkent. Now, as these projects end and
unemployment increases, the government
cites concerns about the impact of thousands of unemployed citizens on Tashkent
political and social culture. According
to an Uzbek diplomat in an interview
with EurasiaNet, “We have seen crowds
of young and unemployed youth attack
government buildings this year in Arab
countries. We must learn a lesson or risk
negative consequences.” By enforcing the
propiska policy, the government seeks
to avoid a concentration of unemployed
individuals, to “clean up” the city for
the Independence Day celebration, and
to channel the labor force back into the
cotton-farming industry.
The ICCPR provides the right to freedom of movement in Article 12, but also
deems exceptions permissible when “necessary to protect national security, public
order, public health, or morals.” Exceptions
32

to Article 12 must be “consistent with
the other rights” in the ICCPR. Because
the presence of Uzbek citizens lacking
Tashkent propiskas poses no risk to these
permissible exceptions and, ultimately,
infringes upon rights guaranteed under
Article 26, the propiska policy violates
Uzbekistan’s international obligations
under the ICCPR.
The propiska system is not a permissible exception to Article 12 because it is
not necessary to protect national security,
public order, public health, or morals.
The Tashkent nonresidents have not presented any threat to governmental control
or caused any disturbance within the city.
Without a substantial threat to the nation,
the Uzbek government is not justified
in suspending the rights of its citizens.
In addition, UN General Comment No.
27 interpreting Article 12 of the ICCPR
requires that exceptions be the “least intrusive instrument amongst those which might
achieve the desired result.” The sweeping
expulsion of citizens from Tashkent is
neither the least intrusive method nor does
it achieve the intended result. Instead, this
system creates widespread corruption and
disproportionate oppression on Tashkent’s
poorest citizens. If the government wishes
to encourage citizens to leave the capital
city, it must create incentives (such as fair
wages and a safe work environment in
the cotton industry) to promote migration
that respects human rights and citizens’
freedoms.
Permissible restrictions must also be
consistent with other rights recognized
by the Covenant, including the Article 26
right to be equal without discrimination.
The propiska system violates this right
in two major ways. On September 15,
2011, Islam Karimov, the Uzbek President,
signed legislation allowing citizens who
own real estate in Tashkent to obtain propiskas. The propiska system also creates
an environment in which Tashkent authorities frequently accept bribes of around
$1,000 from nonresidents to obtain necessary residency documents, creating a de
facto exception for those able to afford
the bribe. Both provisions benefit wealthy
citizens and have a disparate impact on
Uzbekistan’s poor. Because the policy violates the principles of equality and nondiscrimination guaranteed under Article 26
of the ICCPR, it cannot be a permissible
exception to Article 12.
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Because the propiska system is not
a permissible exception to Article 12,
Uzbekistan’s propiska policy damages
human rights protections guaranteed by
the ICCPR. To address its political and
social problems without compromising its
international obligations, the Uzbek government must find a way to encourage its
citizens to consider issues of overpopulation and urbanization without infringing on
the right to move freely within the country
and the right to choose residence.

NEPAL’S NEW PRIME MINISTER
GRANTS IMPUNITY FOR CIVIL WAR
CRIMES
In August, Nepal elected its fourth
prime minister since its first democratic election in 2008. Prime Minister
Baburam Bhattarai, a member of the
Unified Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist), stepped in to lead the Constituent
Assembly away from its political standstill and toward the creation of a longanticipated constitution. Within days of his
election, Bhattarai signed an agreement
withdrawing criminal cases against members of the Maoist party and other political
movements who committed crimes and
human rights abuses during Nepal’s tenyear civil war. The agreement also granted
a general amnesty for these individuals and
groups, protecting those who committed
war crimes during the conflict from being
prosecuted and preventing victims of those
crimes from seeking judicial remedy. As a
party to the International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Nepal
is obligated under Article 2 to provide
“effective remedy” by a “competent judicial...authority” for all those alleging that
their human rights have been violated. By
granting impunity to members of political groups that allegedly caused countless
human rights abuses during the civil war,
Bhattarai’s agreement bars victims from
effective judicial remedy, thereby violating
Article 2 and demonstrating a disregard for
Nepalese citizens’ human rights.
From 1996 to 2006, Nepal experienced
a violent and turbulent civil war as Maoist
rebels overthrew the Hindu monarchy in
hopes of a democratic future. During the
conflict, rebels, including members of
Bhattarai’s Maoist party, and police forces
murdered 15,000 Nepalese, and the country
saw the highest number of political disappearances in the world. As Nepal rebuilds

post-conflict, the combatants and perpetrators of war crimes, many of whom are still
politically affiliated, must slowly reintegrate into society. Now that the Maoists are
in power, public recognition of the horrors
of the civil war through the prosecution of
these combatants would reflect poorly, and
possibly detrimentally, on Bhattarai and his
party. However, Bhattarai’s agreement is
not the first suggestion to grant amnesty to
those who committed politically motivated
war crimes; none of the political movements involved in the civil war want to be
held responsible for the crimes committed
during that time. In the years since the end
of the civil war, there has not been a single
criminal prosecution for crimes committed
during the ten-year conflict.
Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR
requires parties to ensure victims of human
rights violations have access to an effective remedy. Article 2 also specifies that
a competent judicial authority must hear
victims’ claims of alleged violations and
that a competent authority must be able
to enforce identified remedies. General
Comment 31, which informs Article 2
of the ICCPR, specifically highlights the
importance of effective remedy in preventing future violations and that impunity is
a strong contributing factor to the recurrence of violations. The General Comment
also emphasizes the detriment impunity
presents to Article 14, which promotes
judicial independence, and Article 6, which
protects against extrajudicial punishment.
According to the General Comment, a
nation that fails to investigate and to bring
perpetrators to justice can itself be in
breach of the ICCPR because it is not protecting these essential human rights.
In preventing prosecution of pending
cases and granting general amnesty for
all politically motivated human rights violations committed during the civil war,
Bhattarai denies those who wish to prosecute claims against rebels or the former
government access to the only judicial
system in which they may seek remedy
for their harms. This clearly bars victims’
ability to receive reparations for harms
committed during the civil war, which is
essential both to the individuals’ recovery
and the country’s ability to move forward.
Without effective remedy, victims cannot
receive restitution or rehabilitation, and
the Nepalese society cannot benefit from
measures of satisfaction such as public
apologies, public memorials, guarantees of
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non-repetition, and important changes in
the country’s laws and practices.
Like many human rights provisions,
Article 2 of the ICCPR has both positive
and negative legal obligations. The negative legal obligations require signatories to
refrain from violating Article 2. Article 2’s
positive legal obligations are just as essential: the state must prevent third parties
from violating individuals’ civil and political rights. As Nepal continues its transition from monarchy to war-torn territory
to democratic nation, it will be important
for the Constituent Assembly to keep in
mind both Nepal’s positive and negative
legal obligations under the ICCPR. Nepal’s
negative obligation can be met through
the creation of a constitution that protects
the right to access effective remedy and
to have that remedy enforced by competent governmental authorities. The positive
obligation requires the new government to
actively fulfill its obligation of providing
effective remedy by nullifying Bhattarai’s
agreement and allowing victims to pursue
justice.
Megan Wakefield, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers South and Central Asia for
the Human Rights Brief.

EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA & OCEANIA
PAPUA NEW GUINEA’S JUDICIARY
MAKES INCREMENTAL PROGRESS
TO UPHOLD HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
Papua New Guinea (PNG) has long
struggled to protect human rights in the
natural resource extractive industries. PNG
is one of the most resource rich countries
in the Pacific. In 2010 its natural resources
made up 76% of the country’s $5.9 billion in export profits. PNG also struggles
to effectively manage this wealth, and
was ranked 153 out of 187 countries in
the 2011 United Nations Development
Programme’s Human Development Index.
This economic disparity between the state,
resource development corporations, and
customary landowners has resulted in frequent conflict, including PNG’s nine-yearlong civil war. These clashes have also led
to allegations of human rights violations
against mining companies in particular,
ranging from complicity in war crimes to
extrajudicial killings.
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On July 26, 2011, PNG’s National
Court decided what could prove to be a
landmark case for citizens seeking relief
against human rights abuse by transnational corporations. In Medaing v. Ramu
Nico Mgmt. Ltd., landowners and related
third parties sued the owners of a nickel
and cobalt mine for the harmful environmental impacts of its waste removal system. The Appellate Court declined to grant
a permanent injunction, which would have
prohibited dumping into the Astrolabe Bay
on the north coast of Madang Province.
The decision nevertheless recognized two
important legal bases for valid claims of
action against human rights violations in
the future.
The Medaing case was brought on
behalf of customary landowners, as well
as citizens without a proprietary interest
in the mining site but potentially adversely
affected by waste removal plans. The
National Court held that the plaintiffs
had proper standing to bring their public
and private nuisance claims due to their
“close physical connection” and “genuine
interest” in the land in question. The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction against
Ramu Nico’s Deep Sea Tailings Placement
(DSTP) system, which controversially proposed to deposit mining waste at sea levels
where, allegedly, it would not harm marine
life. The court ruled that the DSTP system
was both a public and private nuisance,
since plaintiffs successfully showed the
waste dumping would interfere with the
use of their land, and furthermore cause
inconvenience, damage, or harm to the
general public.
Perhaps most importantly, the National
Court recognized plaintiffs’ alleged
breach of National Goal No. 4 as a justiciable claim of action. The preamble to
the Constitution of PNG delineates five
National Goals, including the conservation
of natural resources and the environment
for the collective benefit of PNG. Section
25 of the Constitution declares these goals
nonjusticiable, but provides exceptions.
The National Court held the exceptions to
mean that it would not exceed its jurisdiction where “judicial power can reasonably
be exercised in such a way as to give effect
to the National Goals.” The court continued
to describe the National Goals as the “core
values” of PNG, which should guide “all
persons and bodies” under the authority of
the Constitution. After interpreting Section

25 and ruling in favor of the plaintiffs on
this claim, the court then held that the same
exception did not require it to take further
action. The court continued to cite the
potentially severe economic consequences
of disrupting mine operations at this late
stage in its development, and declined to
grant a permanent injunction.
The decision is currently on appeal
to the Supreme Court. While failure to
achieve an injunction may be viewed as
a setback, it is in many ways a human
rights victory. The case was the second and
only successful advocacy strategy to bring
a nuisance claim against a transnational
corporation in PNG. Also, recognition of
expanded jurisdiction for PNG’s judiciary
to hear questions on its National Goals
may have lasting impact. National Goal
No. 3 calls for “the State to take effective measures… in particular to control
major enterprises engaged in the exploitation of natural resources.” National Goal
No. 5 calls for “traditional villages and
communities to remain as viable units of
Papua New Guinean society.” The National
Court’s decision may thus provide future
means for legal redress in conflicts arising
between affected local communities and
both transnational corporations and the
state. Goal No. 5 could prove particularly
important by forcing PNG to protect landowner rights and the rights of indigenous
peoples in transactions to develop natural
resources.
Absent an international legal framework to enforce corporate social responsibility, potential victims of abuse by the
extractive industries must rely exclusively
on the PNG government for protection.
The Medaing case and its legacy are
now in the hands of the Supreme Court.
Importantly, PNG’s highest court acts as
an appellate body of the National Court
and comprises of National Court judges in
ad hoc panels. Should it overturn parts of
Justice Cannings’ decision, the approach
giving effect to the Constitution’s National
Goals will nevertheless make its way to the
Supreme Court in future cases. Despite a
setback for the Medaing plaintiffs, PNG’s
judiciary is embracing its role in the protection of human rights.
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CAMBODIA TARGETS CIVIL SOCIETY
ACTIVITY WITH REVISED PENAL CODE
AND PENDING NGO LAW
Cambodia’s increasing exercise of
authority to restrict civil society activity
has drawn much criticism from the international community. In July, a Cambodian
appeals court upheld what some observers
consider a groundless conviction on incitement charges against a staff member of the
Cambodian League for the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights (LICADHO).
This decision was followed in August by
the suspension of the NGO Sahmakum
Teang Tnaut (STT), an advocate for the
urban poor in land rights cases. The fivemonth-long suspension lacked clear justification and cited vague breaches of
administrative regulations. Together, these
incidents reflect the Cambodian government’s abuse of legal means to enforce
near-absolute discretion in regulating civil
society, in particular the revised Penal
Code and the pending Law on Associations
and Non-Governmental Organizations.
Cambodia’s revised Penal Code is controversial for creating new crimes and
expanding preexisting ones to potentially
threaten freedom of expression. The new
law took effect on December 10, 2010.
While eliminating Disinformation as a
crime frequently enforced in allegations of
“disturb[ing] the public peace,” the revised
code creates five new provisions in its
place. New crimes of Public Defamation,
Public Insult, and Slanderous Denunciation
are broadly defined and may be used to stifle opposing political views. Discrediting a
Judicial Decision and False Denunciation
to Judicial Authority are also crimes carrying prison sentences of up to 6 months and
monetary fines. Furthermore, Article 495
of the revised code criminalizes incitement
as, “creat[ing] serious turmoil in society.”
Defamation, Public Insult, and Incitement
to Discrimination may all be triggered by
speech or publicly displayed writing or
drawings. These crimes potentially conflict
with protections on freedom of expression afforded citizens by the Cambodian
Constitution. They may also be used in a
manner conflicting with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), to which Cambodia is a State
Party.
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Broad governmental regulatory powers created under the pending Law on
Associations and Non-Government
Organizations (LANGO) contain a similar
potential for politicization. The draft law is
currently with the Ministry of the Interior,
after which it will move to the Council of
Ministers and National Assembly for final
approval. LANGO is in its third iteration
and will impact both international and
domestic NGOs.
Unlike the voluntary registration
scheme in Cambodia’s 2007 Civil Code,
NGO registration under LANGO will
become mandatory. For foreign organizations, the law proposes a 45-day approval
period with no clear grounds for denying
applications. Only Cambodian nationals
can establish domestic associations and
NGOs; this provision excludes refugees,
stateless persons, and other non-Cambodian residents. LANGO also requires
groups to notify local government authorities in writing of any activity or training

event. In addition to the 2007 Civil Code,
these provisions are contrary to the Law
on Peaceful Demonstrations, which does
not require governmental notification of
“education dissemination activities.” Taken
together, the provisions not only conflict
with sources of Cambodian law, but might
also amount to a breach of the ICCPR’s
freedom of association protections, and the
national implementation of provisions of
the ICCPR to the Cambodian Constitution,
namely Articles 35, 41 and 42.
Amidst this increasingly hostile environment, civil society possesses limited
means of redress. Cambodia has established
domestic human rights bodies in name, but
these bodies are under the authority of
the Senate, National Assembly, and prime
minister’s cabinet. Groups could seek to
challenge the constitutionality of legislation through Cambodia’s Constitutional
Council, but they must gain referrals
from the King, elected officials, or the
Supreme Court in the course of litigation.
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Such appeals to domestic remedies do not
encourage optimism in a country ranked
66th out of 66 countries for corruption,
according to the World Justice Project, and
65th for providing effective limits on government powers.
On the 20th anniversary of the Paris
Peace Accords, Cambodian civil society must again look to the international
community for assistance. Whether these
efforts will succeed, including appeals to
the UN by US NGOs and monetary restrictions imposed by the World Bank, remains
to be seen. After nearly two decades of
foreign assistance, Cambodia demonstrates
growing resolve to implement a repressive
legal framework, with rule of law secondary to government discretion.
Thais-Lyn Trayer, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers East, Southeast Asia &
Oceania for the Human Rights Brief.

